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Introduction 
 
 
Nigeria: Boko Haram and the 
Regionalization of Terrorism 
Denis M. Tull and Annette Weber 
The wave of violence unleashed in north-eastern Nigeria by the militant terror group 
Boko Haram and the regionalization of terrorism have spurred neighboring Chad, 
Cameroon and Niger into action. Since March 2015, they have been conducting mili-
tary operations in the border regions, sometimes on Nigerian territory, in an effort to 
push back the terrorists. Nigeria and its neighbors have officially agreed a multilateral 
military operation with the aim of neutralizing Boko Haram. However, for domestic 
political reasons, Nigeria is blocking regional cooperation, while a UN Security Council 
mandate for the force is in the making. International support for the planned military 
operation will be futile unless Abuja changes course. It remains to be seen, if the newly 
elected President Muhammadu Buhari will bring change. 
 
Boko Haram’s stated aim is to proclaim a 
caliphate in Nigeria and to eliminate the 
country’s political class and all “infidels”. 
Most of the victims of its attacks are Mus-
lims in Nigeria’s economically marginalized 
north-east. Under the leadership of Abu-
bakar Shekau, the group has become radi-
calized and has escalated its military and 
terrorist activities. It is thought to have as 
many as 10,000 members at present, in-
cluding countless forcibly recruited children 
and teenagers. Since 2009, at least 10,000 
people have fallen victim to violence by 
Boko Haram and the security forces, and 
more than 1.5 million have been displaced, 
including around 150,000 who have taken 
refuge in neighboring countries. A few 
days before the presidential elections on 
28 March 2015, Islamic State (IS) “accepted” 
Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance. 
Background and organization 
It is no coincidence that north-eastern 
Nigeria, comprising Borno, Adamawa and 
Yobe states, is the epicenter of Boko Haram’s 
activities. The region has some of the world’s 
worst economic indicators. More than 70 
per cent of the population live in extreme 
poverty, and 85 per cent of people in Borno 
are illiterate. The decline of local industries 
such as textile production has worsened un-
employment, as has the impact of terrorism, 
such as border closures and curfews. Boko 
Haram’s agenda explicitly addresses local 
and national abuses of power, and its criti-
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cism of corruption amongst the political 
class particularly touches a nerve. Its jiha-
dist propaganda, which claims to offer 
the prospect of salvation from the failure 
of politics and traditional social models, 
seems to have the desired effect. In a 
macabre way, the numerous attacks on 
civilian targets such as markets, bus sta-
tions, schools and religious institutions, 
both Muslim and Christian, are also prov-
ing successful. Since 2014, territorial con-
trol has become an increasing focus of 
interest for the group. Coordinated attacks 
on military facilities and key infrastruc-
tures in Nigeria and Cameroon have dem-
onstrated that Boko Haram is also equipped 
for more conventional warfare. 
The Nigerian government so far oscil-
lated between indifference and repression: 
indifference, because former President Good-
luck Jonathan (2010–2015) has never indi-
cated that fighting terrorism is a national 
priority; repression, because Nigerian secu-
rity forces have massacred thousands of 
civilians and suspected followers of Boko 
Haram. Through its incompetence, the gov-
ernment has further inflamed public oppo-
sition and, most likely, has driven more 
sympathizers into the arms of the militant 
terrorists. The government’s action thus 
reinforces the view – widespread in north-
ern Nigeria – that the region is being delib-
erately marginalized. The fact that since 
Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, it 
has always been governed by presidents 
from the south (apart from 2007–2010), is 
regarded in the north as evidence of this 
imbalance. The failure, so far, to neutralize 
Boko Haram is often not attributed to 
government incompetence but is seen as 
politically motivated. The government, it 
is claimed, is taking no action because 
the region is politically and economically 
meaningless to the center. 
Nigeria’s neighbors under pressure 
In view of Boko Haram’s cross-border incur-
sions, more intensive military cooperation 
between the region’s countries would seem 
to be a sensible approach, but is by no means 
a given. This became apparent after the 
French-organized summit on Boko Haram, 
in Paris on 17 May 2014, which was attended 
by the presidents of all the affected coun-
tries. A raft of decisions were taken – ex-
change of intelligence, coordinated patrols, 
pooling of resources, and a commitment to 
a regional counter-terrorism strategy – but 
there was little follow-up at first. This situa-
tion remained largely unchanged until 
March 2015, when the countries bordering 
Lake Chad launched military operations 
in north-eastern Nigeria and the border 
regions, accompanied by a Nigerian Army 
offensive. The threat posed by Boko Haram 
has apparently intensified to such an extent 
in recent months that the benefits of region-
al cooperation outweigh the (remaining) 
concerns, at least for Nigeria’s Francophone 
neighbors, which are already struggling 
with the influx of some 150,000 Nigerian 
refugees. 
Cameroon should be mentioned in par-
ticular, whose northern region has frequent-
ly been targeted by Boko Haram since 2014. 
This forced an apathetic government to 
concede that the militant terror group’s 
activities were no longer simply a Nigerian 
problem. Cameroon has boosted its military 
presence in the region with a further 2,000 
troops, who have battled Boko Haram on 
countless occasions in recent months. Ac-
cording to government statements, hun-
dreds of terrorists have been killed in these 
clashes, along with several dozen soldiers. 
Since February 2015, Boko Haram has 
also turned its sights on Niger and Chad. 
Both countries are now caught in a vice: to 
the north of their national territories, there 
is the threat of spillover effects from Libya’s 
disintegration; in the south, a new flash-
point has emerged with the escalation in 
Nigeria. Chad’s capital is just a stone’s 
throw from Boko Haram’s operational area, 
while the country’s economy is dependent 
on the transit of goods across Cameroonian 
territory (imports, pipelines for oil exports). 
The participation of these three neighbors 
in the struggle against Boko Haram serves 
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clearly defined political and economic 
interests. Their governments expect further 
benefits to accrue from their engagement, 
not least from Western countries, given 
that France and the US in particular are 
desperately seeking effective partners in the 
campaign against the spread of jihadism in 
Africa. As the quid pro quo, Western coun-
tries grant fragile and domestically dented 
regimes (Niger) and authoritarian govern-
ments (Cameroon and Chad) a measure of 
international legitimacy and reputation, 
as well as more practical, security-related 
benefits such as training for troops, capac-
ity building and military materiel. This 
approach obviously bears risks and should 
not stand alone. 
The Multi-National Joint Task Force 
In early February 2015, Nigeria, Cameroon, 
Chad and Niger (plus Benin) agreed to 
establish an 8,700-strong Multi-National 
Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Since then, nego-
tiations have been under way between 
these countries, the African Union (AU) and 
international partners (the US, France and 
the United Nations) on the Task Force’s 
mandate, composition, operational strategy 
and resourcing. It has already been decided 
that the Task Force should be a multidimen-
sional operation with military, police and 
civilian components. The AU Commission 
is lobbying for international support for 
the MNJTF and is also mediating between 
Nigeria and its neighbors, whose bilateral 
relations are historically burdened as a con-
sequence of border disputes. 
The AU is pushing for a UN Security 
Council mandate for the Task Force under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. There is also 
an expectation that the Security Council 
will set up an international fund in order 
to mobilize flexible financial and logistical 
support for the Task Force. The speed and 
scope of this assistance will, however, 
depend on the MNJTF countries themselves. 
Besides the continued failure to deploy the 
pledged troops (Nigeria: 3,250; Chad: 3,000; 
Cameroon: 950; Niger: 750; Benin: 750), the 
greatest obstacle to the Task Force’s func-
tionality is the lack of a political consensus 
on a common approach. 
Roadblock Nigeria 
More than two months after the adoption 
of the decision to establish the MNJTF, 
there is still no sign of a coordinated mili-
tary approach by the stakeholder countries. 
Chad’s cooperation with Cameroon and 
Niger, respectively, is progressing satisfac-
torily, but the key player – Nigeria – is still 
in denial. Under President Jonathan Abuja 
has refused to grant formal permission for 
its partners to pursue members of Boko 
Haram across its borders or, indeed, to carry 
out attacks in Nigeria itself. The border 
closure between Cameroon and Nigeria is 
respected by both sides. However, since 
February, the Chadian Armed Forces have 
repeatedly encroached on Nigerian terri-
tory, often together with troops from Niger. 
The Nigerian government’s silence in the 
face of these incursions has domestic and 
foreign policy causes. For Nigeria, which 
sees itself as a leading regional power in 
Africa, it is uniquely humiliating to be a 
recipient of military assistance – worse still, 
from Francophone states, which it has tra-
ditionally regarded as vassals of France, the 
former colonial power. This signifies a mas-
sive loss of face both regionally and inter-
nationally, made more potent still by the in-
volvement of South African mercenaries in 
the Nigerian offensive against Boko Haram. 
Before the 28 March 2015 presidential 
elections, it was impossible for the Jonathan 
government to publicly voice approval of 
Chad’s intervention against Boko Haram 
on Nigerian territory. To do so would have 
meant admitting its own impotence. Mu-
hammadu Buhari won the elections with 
his campaign message that he has the mili-
tary skills needed to conquer Boko Haram, 
among other things. His religious and eth-
nic identity meant that he is likely regarded 
throughout northern Nigeria as a president 
more committed to solve the region’s prob-
lems, including Boko Haram. However, on 
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14 April 2015, the anniversary of the abduc-
tion of the 276 schoolgirls from Chibok 
by Boko Haram, the president-elect did not 
make any promises for their return. 
Nigeria’s domestic policy configuration 
thus explains why Abuja is talking down 
the successes achieved by its regional part-
ners, especially Chad. However, from its 
neighbors’ perspective, whose armed forces 
are paying a heavy price in blood, this is 
a demeaning and disrespectful attitude 
that stands in the way of cooperation. For 
example, since the start of military opera-
tions in February, 71 Chadian soldiers have 
lost their lives while more than 400 have 
been injured. As long as there is a con-
tinued lack of genuine willingness on the 
part of Nigeria to engage in regional co-
operation, the MNJTF will remain a costly 
and ineffective operation. 
What is unlikely, by contrast, is a mili-
tary solution to the problem of Boko Haram. 
The armed forces of Chad and Niger can 
do no more than contain the militants and 
drive them back into Nigeria. The Nigerian 
troops have already provided ample evi-
dence of their inadequacy. The Chadian 
Armed Forces, whose reputation was great-
ly enhanced by their deployment in Mali, 
should not be overestimated. As part of the 
AU-led International Support Mission in the 
Central African Republic (MISCA) in 2014, 
Chadian troops played more of a destabiliz-
ing role. They were also alleged to have com-
mitted serious human rights abuses, ulti-
mately prompting the government of Chad 
to withdraw its troops from the mission. 
Outlook 
Boko Haram’s as yet merely symbolic al-
liance with Islamic State should not take 
up too much (international) attention or 
prompt an overreaction from Western 
countries. This would simply play into the 
hands of the group, whose goal is to secure 
their international reputation and notoriety. 
It is media coverage of terrorism that puts 
militant groups on the world map, creating 
a pull effect which enables terror groups to 
attract more recruits and leverage more 
resources both locally and nationally. 
However, the threat of Boko Haram’s 
regionalization is no longer a future sce-
nario. Enhanced regional cooperation is 
therefore an appropriate and necessary 
approach. But this will only be effective 
if Nigeria declares its unconditional will-
ingness to cooperate with its neighbors. 
Western actors should attempt to speed up 
developments towards this goal, doing so 
directly, through support (resources and 
expertise) for the MNJTF and diplomatic 
persuasion towards Abuja; and indirectly, 
through coordination with international 
partners – above all, the AU, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
and the United Nations – which can also 
bring influence to bear on Nigeria. In the 
aftermath of the presidential elections, 
chances should have increased that the 
government is more receptive to cooperate 
with its neighbors. Only if Boko Haram is 
rapidly contained will it be possible to pre-
vent the regionalization of terrorism and a 
further surge in recruitment, prompted by 
the group’s alliance with IS. There is also 
a fear that jihadists from Libya and Sudan 
and countries further afield will come to 
Nigeria and that Nigerians will increasingly 
join other operations. 
Medium- and long-term neutralization 
of Boko Haram also requires political and 
economic responses. The marginalization 
of northern and north-eastern Nigeria must 
end, with political, economic and social 
inclusion playing an important role. This 
must include investment in public services, 
training and job creation programmes, and 
measures to revitalize the local economy. In 
order to strengthen social structures, sup-
port for religious education and reconcilia-
tion initiatives is vital. Amnesties for mem-
bers of Boko Haram and the resumption of 
political negotiations should also be recon-
sidered. And lastly, it is essential to educate 
the security forces about respect for human 
rights. 
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